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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Unskilled Immigrants, are they Enemies of Native Workers? 
-Study on General Equilibrium Model of Immigration Surplus- 
 
By 
 
Sung-Hoon JEA 
 
 
From the late 1980s, Korea became a new destination of unskilled foreign workers, and they got to compose 
over 1 percent total labor force in 2000. Mostly coming from underdeveloped, other Asian neighborhood, 
they work in small, manufacturing factories where natives no more want to work. 
According to Borjas’ (1994) immigration surplus model, natives benefit from labor import because of 
production complementarities between immigrant workers and other factors of production. Empirical 
estimation suggests that 1% unskilled labor import in Korea has contributed to a bit less than 0.002% 
increase in GDP or about 7 billion won in a 450 trillion won economy in the latter half of the 1990s. This 
small impact results partly from low percentage of immigrants’ presence in Korean labor market. If their 
fraction increases, foreign workers will bring larger surplus because of high elasticity of factor price for 
labor. Moreover, diverse socio-economic theories strongly suggest that immigration does not greatly reduce 
the natives’ employment opportunities thanks to segmented labor market structures and after-immigration 
economic expansion. 
Thus, even though there are some disputes on desirable level of immigrants’ skill or the effect of income 
redistribution, it is agreed that foreign workers will play an important role in Korean economic activities 
when their labor participation expands. 
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Introduction 
 
From the late 1980s, Newly Industrialized Economies (which had been perceived as labor sending countries) 
in Asia started to receive unskilled labor from much less developed countries. The Republic of Korea (Korea 
hereafter) also accepted labor import implicitly from 1987 with a peak of 284,145 workers in December 
2000. Asian economic crisis in 1997 shocked to decrease the total of migrant workers, but it recovers to 
exceed the prior level. The number of migrant workers is still low compared with other traditional 
immigration destinations such as Western European countries and the United States; however, social issues 
already emerge on migration. 13 Nepal workers had started to protest against maltreatment and for their 
human rights at Myungdong cathedral in 1995, and other similar cases for human right concerns and delayed 
payments were followed. 
 
Unskilled labor import is not only a sociological concern, but it reflects the current Korean economic status 
as well. Gu-Ro Industrial Complex in Seoul is marked as a low-paid, labor-intensive working place. The 
urban poor and the young female had fulfilled the labor needs respectively from the 1960s to mid-70s, and 
up to late 1980s. But nowadays Chinese Koreans replace them. Similar phenomena have occurred in Ansan 
city in Kyunggi province and others. As other developed countries have faced massive labor migration in a 
certain level of development with decreased fertility, Korea cannot reverse multiplied foreign labor inflows. 
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However, many people seem to believe that immigrants replace Koreans in their manufacturing workplaces 
as was shown in Gu-Ro area, and current high unemployment is partly due to the import of foreign workers. 
Still others expect labor import will pull down the wage rates and squeeze the natives’ level of employment 
in manufacturing. They are afraid that foreigners will replace Koreans in a labor market. Nevertheless, 
employers in small and medium size enterprises suffer from high labor deficiency, while insisting to import 
more labor that they can exploit by offering extremely low wages.  
 
To analyze in which way labor import, especially the unskilled, might affect the Korean labor market is a 
prerequisite for how we manage the immigration problems. This study has two main questions on it. First is 
whether immigration increases the general equilibrium of national economy, let alone the sociological 
impacts. Second is, even though immigration does not harm the total wealth, whether they deprive the native 
workers of employment opportunities.  
 
To gauge the social costs, until now, many economic studies have tested whether immigrants are 
complements or substitutes for native workers, and most studies agree that foreigners largely complement 
with native labor by using partial equilibrium model of different labor market diagrams. But it will be 
introduced, in my study, the general equilibrium model of George Borjas; how the supply of foreigners 
affects the total output of economy as well as the labor market. If some positive signs can be found both on 
labor and output market, we may further argue to open immigrant inflow and stop discriminating them. 
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Before the prolonged discussion, this paper describes, in the first part, backgrounds on immigrant flows in 
Korea. Economic theories on both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors of labor migration will be discussed to explain 
the causes of immigration towards Korea. In addition, it will be described the scale of labor migration from 
the late 1980s and its characteristics such as ethical or skill composition.  
In second part, general equilibrium model of immigration surplus will be introduced. Accepting foreign 
workers is profitable for an economy insofar as there exists immigration surplus, that is, the increase in 
national income that occurs as a result of immigration and that accrues to natives. Theory itself predicts, 
when the labor characteristics of migrants differ from those in natives, the profit of labor import can be 
maximized. The presence of this surplus will be tested on guest workers in Korea, with same frameworks 
that Borjas did for the U.S. case in his paper, “The Economic Benefits from Immigration” (1994) 
In the third part, the diversely assessed analyses will be conducted in a way to justify the test results in favor 
of the unskilled immigration- immigrants do not reduce the natives’ job opportunities. 
In the concluding part, based on the findings, Korean government policies on immigration are critically 
assessed for further investigations and discussions on a purpose to increase the immigration surplus or 
enhance the quality of labor market. 
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Backgrounds on Immigration in Korea 
Theories on Immigrant Flows 
Before we talk about the foreign workers, it needs to define the terminology. The expression used for them in 
academics is ‘migrant’. According to international usage, a migrant is someone who leaves a country of 
which he or she is a national, or who has left it. This person can be called as ‘immigrant’, ‘foreign worker’ or 
‘foreigner’ in the country where gainful employment is sought. (BÖhning 1996) The meaning is limited in 
our paper; therefore, the word ‘guest worker’ can be used as well to refer short-term migrants. But 
demographically justified minorities or humanitarian refugees are not discussed here. In this paper, 
‘immigrant’ will be frequently used to stress the side of receiving country, ‘migrants in Korea’ 
 
Economic Theories of Migration 
A lot of explanatory models have been proposed for migration. Some stress on motivation, while others look 
at the structures, which force people to decide to leave their countries. Some underline ‘push’ factors from 
the sending countries, whereas others emphasize ‘pull’ factors from the receiving ones. Stalker (2000) 
summarized them into four different models under this category. These are neo-classical economic theory, 
new economics of migration, dual labor market theory and world systems theory. 
 
First two theories put emphasis on immigrants’ motivation on migration. Neoclassical economic theory 
stresses on the gap in the supply and demand for labor between sending and receiving countries. Workers 
decide to move in response to larger labor demand and higher wage rates. Neoclassical theory assumes that 
individuals are so rational to maximize the returns on their human capital.  
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New economics of migration extends the sight to families or households as well as individual workers. 
Sending one of their families abroad diversifies earnings as insurance, especially where employment 
stability is not secured. Liberalization and international trades have weakened the job stability, and this, as a 
‘push’ factor, may make households prone to dissipate their income risks. 
 
Those who prefer structural approaches are interested in four waves of migration in modern history. First 
wave is marked with settlement in new continents and plantation in colonies from sixteenth to early 
twentieth centuries. Second wave corresponds to Reconstruction in Europe during the 1950s and the 1960s 
after the Second World War. Third wave is the construction boom in Middle East in the 1970s. The last flow 
of labor is the recent immigration into NIEs and Latin America. Structure theories focus on which factors 
have facilitated four distinctive waves under socio-economic backgrounds.  
 
Dual labor market theory supposes international labor flow as irreversible and persistent phenomenon. In 
industrial societies, some should work in unfavorable conditions and accept unstable employment. However, 
indigenous people have been well educated, and they intend to get better jobs. Developed countries cannot 
but fill the labor blank by ‘pulling’ foreign workers into their markets. Immigrants, in contrast, especially 
non-permanent economic immigrants, have less choice but take whatever they can get to earn their bread.  
World systems theory focuses on the international capital flow. The capitalist penetration of rich economies 
to poor ones generates a world system by destroying traditional industries in the latter. A set of mobile labor 
occurs among who have lost the sources of income, and part of them are ‘pushed’ to migrate abroad. 
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In figure 1, four different theories, discussed so far, are classified into four categories. 
Figure 1. Migrant Theories under Four Categories 
 ‘Pull’ Effect ‘Push’ Effect 
Motivation Neo-classical economic theory New economics of migration 
Structure Dual labor market theory World systems theory 
 
Since our interest tries to detect whether there is market gains of labor import in a hosting country, it will be 
analyzed, if possible, who will get the profit, and when it will be maximized under certain labor market 
conditions in a receiving country. Thus, dual labor market theory of migration is useful to approach that 
which pull factors trigger labor migration in Korea, and how native labor market is structurally affected by 
foreign labor inflow. Not only the causes of immigration, but the following discussions on the gains of 
immigration as well will be assessed, based on this theory. 
 
Causes of Immigration in Korea 
As dual labor market theory suggests, recent immigration trend in middle-income countries can be 
understood on the same line that traditional immigration countries have faced more than a century. Freeman 
and Mo (1996) said that higher economic performance and industrialization in NIEs reached to the point that 
low fertility and industrial restructuring pulled their natives to higher level of jobs, while low-skilled, labor-
intensive work faced labor shortage. The low fertility rate already made rural areas to lose their function of 
labor reserves for urban manufacturing; moreover, due to around 1 percent Korean population growth rate, 
Source: Stalker (2000) 
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there have been some symptoms of labor deficiency from the beginning of the 1980s. Only the share of 
female and old age population has expanded, but they are not apt to conduct manufacturing work, which 
usually requires physical strength. The large demand for labor in service and IT sectors of better payment 
shows that labor shortage for unskilled, hard working jobs will last in the future. 
 
However, these factors are short of explaining the structural backgrounds on labor import in Korea 
especially among small and medium size enterprises (SMEs). It should be noted, besides native labor drain, 
the dramatic increase on undergraduates and strong labor movements, started in 1987. Rapid college 
enrollment rate has boosted the number of skilled workers and elevated their expectations at work. Together 
with economic boom, new entrants have sought more safe work with higher remuneration on labor market. 
But the upturn of strong trade unionism caused to increase male, regular workers’ wages in large companies, 
or make labor market more rigid. This unionism, whether it has been significantly dominant or not, has 
contributed into two ways. First, as the wage differentials between large and SMEs have been enlarged, 
competent workers prefer only to work in conglomerates. On the other hand, capital owners in large 
companies made subcontracts or outsourcing with SMEs to relieve labor costs; the quality of work has been 
deteriorated in SMEs only to demand low skilled workers. The aggregate result is that labor market is 
segmented into for large companies and SMEs.  
 
But the increase of skilled labor, in turn, lowered unskilled labor supply. Wages for unskilled workers have 
been multiplied as well. To downsize high wage costs, SMEs should move plants in cheap, labor abundant 
countries, but weak capital deters it. Therefore, they started to accept guest workers to fulfill labor blank. 
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Labor shortage can be clearly noticed among SMEs (less than 300 persons) as is given in table 1. The 
smaller the establishment size is, the more difficult hiring manufacturing workers. (Extremely low 
deficiency rates after 1998 mostly results from Asian economic crisis in 1997. But even in this case, small 
firms still have relative difficulty in getting labor.) 
 
Table 1. Labor Shortage rate in manufacturing, by establishment size (%) 
 1990 1993 1995 1998 2000 
Total 6.85 6.04 5.80 0.73 1.70 
10-29 persons 15.24 7.89 9.64 2.16 3.41 
30-99 8.93 7.44 6.62 0.80 3.23 
100-299 7.07 10.40 6.82 0.40 1.98 
300-499 5.16 5.72 2.87 0.11 1.20 
500 or more 2.26 3.21 1.63 0.07 0.35 
Source: Report on the Labor Demand Survey, Ministry of Labor, Korea, corresponding years 
 
Of course, there are other factors. 1986 Asian Olympics and 1988 Olympics in Seoul could provide chances 
to show Korean economic development around the world, and many peoples started to be interested in 
having jobs in Korea. But undoubtedly, reestablished relations with Mainland China and Russia have 
contributed many Korean origins to settle down in the southern part of the peninsula. The failure of 
vocational education to meet the needs at work also has stagnated the supply of modest skilled workers. 
(Seol, 1999) There still exist many other elements to examine, but since this paper focuses on immigration 
surplus, these things will be discussed later in detail in linkage with that immigration surplus. Before that, 
the immigration characteristics in Korea need to be examined. 
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Labor Migration in Korea 
Total number of immigrants has increased more than a decade. They were just 6,409 in 1987 but sharply 
jumped to 284,145 in 2000, markedly during 1994-97 and after 1999. (Figure 2) However, The mere 
comparison of sums is insufficient to examine the patterns of migration and their causes. The migrants 
should be classified on legal status, skill or employment sectors for deep analysis. Before going into the 
immigration data, first glance at the changing migration condition in Korea. 
Figure 2. Number of Foreign Workers in Korea
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Change from sending to receiving country 
Even though Korea became one of the hosts of immigration, it was until recently a major exporter of labor. 
This massive outflow peaked at the end of 1981, at which point there were over 150,000 Korean contract 
workers in the Middle East to earn ‘oil dollars’ and send them to their families at home. However, as income 
and employment expanded in Korean market, labor exports declined sharply (Figure 3). By 1990, the total 
number of emigrants in the Middle East dropped to 8,000.  
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Figure 3. Emigration from Korea, 1981-1990
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However, it does not mean that Korea ceased to be a source of emigration. In 1992, for instance, 23,628 
Koreans legally leaved for USA, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The difference between them and 
former contract workers lies in that recent emigrants seek to higher quality of life, and their wages and skills 
are relatively on upper level. But the opposite inflow is our main interest of study. While the type of Korean 
emigration changed from money for living to higher quality of life, the immigration pattern transformed 
from small sized, skilled labor to large sized, unskilled labor around 1987. That is, it was almost first time in 
Korean history that foreigners work in Korean companies under the control and direction of Koreans. So the 
number and the characteristics of immigration will be deeply investigated. 
 
Diverse statistics on labor import 
There are several ways to detect the characteristics of immigrants. Above all, first way is to class them on a 
legal basis. Migrant workers in Korea are categorized into three groups under the Immigration Control Law. 
First is the formal employment where legal status is given to skilled workers involved in reporting, business, 
technology transfer, capital investment, education and research, and entertainment. Second group is 
unskilled foreigners under the Industrial trainee program. This program was first introduced in 1994, 
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modeled after the new Practical Trainee Program in Japan. Foreign trainees are allocated into and work for 
medium-small sized factories, but they are not protected as ‘workers’ on a legal basis. We will deal with this 
issue on the latter part of paper. Third, illegal workers mattered. Illegal workers denote those who work for 
companies in Korea without working visa as well as overstayed visa or others. In a detailed format, illegality 
can be expressed as ⅰ) illegal residence and work, ⅱ) legal residence and undeclared work or ⅲ) illegal 
employment and work practices (Biffl, 1996), where the latter two categories are also pertinent to native 
workers.  
 
However, formal employment is excluded from the discussion because the size is small and stable during 
recent years, but quite different from the last two types in the level of skills that are required. Formal 
employment is mostly concentrated on skilled work, whereas the other two are unskilled one. In table 2, we 
can find out unskilled workers, who participate in simple processing or assembling, overwhelmingly takes 
more than 90% of whole immigrants from the beginning of the 1990s. 
 
Table 2. Foreign Workers by Legal Status, 1987-2000 
 
Then, it is a next question that who composes the pool of unskilled migrants. Along their origin of countries, 
the top five sending countries to Korea are China, Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam and Bangladesh in 2000, 
that is, 70% of all immigrants come from these countries, which are geographically located in East Asia. 
Wage differentials, volume of trade and direct investment other than geographical proximity may trigger 
large flow of migrants, but it is beyond our subject to figure them out in this page. 
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However, as one of the largest diaspora nations, Korea opened the border to a lot of Koreans abroad 
(especially Koreans in China). Korean government facilitated the entry of Koreans abroad on strong 
brotherhood at the initial phase. On the other hand, Korean companies were eager to recruit them since they 
did not need to worry about the language problem. Freeman and Mo (1996) assumed that Korea gives 
preference to potential migrants with whom they share same ethnicity. But this does not mean Korea accept 
more migrants on a sort of nationalistic grounds. The homogeneity of people may help to replace other 
nations for Koreans abroad; this does not necessarily lead to expansion in total quota of immigration since 
the government strictly controlled the size of migrants on economic needs under the Industrial trainee 
program. On the contrary, the preferable immigration policies for them actually were stopped in 1995. In 
table 3, migrants in Korea are denoted by nationality and brotherhood. We can see Chinese Koreans still 
share a large part of immigrants in both foreign trainees and illegal workers. 
 
Table 3. Nationality, Brotherhood of Foreign Workers, 2000 
 
The most important statistics may be types of industries where immigrants are employed; in terms that 
companies who suffer massively labor deficiency recruit more foreigners, and these findings can be linked to 
dual labor market structure. First, in size of enterprises, 78.1% of immigrants under the Industrial trainee 
program worked in a medium size company of 21-200 employees in 1995. More specifically, they are 
allocated by 29.8% for company size of 51-100, 29.4% for 21-50, and 18.9% for 100-200. (Table 4) As for 
illegal workers, there is no official data on their employment. Only sample data exist, which was conducted 
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by Seol (1999) with 620 cases in 1995. 40.6% of them worked in a small size company of 10-29 employees. 
(31.7% of Chinese Koreans and 54.8% of other nations) (Table 5) 
 
Table 4. Foreign Trainees on Each Size of Firms, 1995 
Table 5. Illegal Workers on Each Size of Firms, 1995 
 
Second are types of job. 86.4% of trainees and illegal workers are engaged in fiber/textile (46.8%), 
fabricated metal products/machinery and equipment (28.0%), chemicals/plastic products (11.6%) in 1995 
(Table 6) by frequently doing simple processing. Other study found that foreigners also participate in 
construction, agriculture/fishery, housekeeping, food, mining and others. Construction, agriculture and 
mining are perceived as the major work of immigrants in U.S.A and Western Europe, but the portion remains 
almost negligible in Korea. It is partly because these sectors are relatively small compared to other countries, 
or labor import in certain sectors is strongly deterred by government’s restrictive policies. 
 
Table 6. Employment by Industries, 1995 
 
In this section, we found out that labor inflow has expanded over a decade, and Korea became a destination 
of migrants. In the 1990s, unskilled immigrants, who are composed of trainees and illegal workers, have 
dramatically exceeded skilled ones in size. Mostly coming from other Asian neighbors, they conduct simple 
work in small, manufacturing factories. We can, thus, support that the migrants work in SMEs where labor 
shortage is structurally severe, and that their types of jobs are related to a work unfavorable and hard but 
needed in a segmented labor market. Thus, the statistics we discussed so far may provide a meaningful 
feedback for analyses for labor migration that will be examined in the following parts. 
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Gains from Immigration  
Theoretical Framework- Immigration Surplus 
When immigration occurs, do natives gain profits? If so, how large the gains are, where these benefits come 
from, or who will get them? In order to compute the net economic impact of immigration, immigrant 
contribution to the hosting country should be measured. 
There is one static way to assess this size of the contributions. Consider a labor market diagram presented in 
figure 4, the supply and demand curves are denoted as S and D, (labor supply curve is assumed to be 
inelastic; in other words, there is N number of native-born workers.) In a competitive labor market condition, 
wage will be set at the point of W0 with N level of employment unless immigration is allowed. So, the 
trapezoid ABN0 means the values of national income that each worker and capital owner earns prior to 
immigration. However, when immigrants enter the country, the supply curve moves to the right (from S to 
S’) by the number of guest workers (G), and the total size of workers in that country increase to M (=N+G). 
Given the increased labor supply, wage level tends to fall to W1, but national income expands the size to the 
trapezoid ACMO 
 
If the changes are deeply analyzed, by using extra and cheaper workforce, capital owners or employers get 
initial benefits in the triangle ABW0, and plus additional profits by the area in W0BCW1 where the rectangle 
W0BFW1 is exactly transferred from the incomes of native workers. The rectangle FCMN goes to the 
immigrants. So the increase in national income that accrues to natives is given by in the triangle BCF. This 
triangle represents immigration surplus that results from immigration, and that is supposed to return to the 
natives, esp. native-owned firms. (Borjas, 1999) 
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Figure 4. Immigration Surplus 
     Source: Borjas, 1999 
George Borjas’ Immigration surplus arises since the market wage equals the productivity of the last 
immigrant hired. As a consequence, immigrants contribute to increase national income by more than the 
costs owed to them. But as is depicted in figure 4, without paying lower wages to native workers, 
immigration surplus cannot be obtained. Suppose that the demand curve is perfectly elastic, immigrants or 
labor increase have no impact on the native wage rate. It suggests that the immigration surplus is 
proportional to the elasticity of factor price for labor. When the elasticity of factor price is small (in absolute 
value), the surplus as well will be small. In other words, unless labor demand curve is inelastic, immigration 
surplus cannot be maximized. It implies that natives gain from immigration when there exist production 
complementarities between immigrant workers and other factors of production. (Borjas 1994) These other 
factors of production can be capital or labor that has different level of skills. And the latter case entails that, 
if immigrants differ from natives in their skills and types of jobs, immigration can bring benefits to the 
hosting country. 
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The value of immigration surplus, or the size of the triangle BCF can be measured by the following formula,  
Immigration Surplus )()10(
2
1 NMWWQn −×−×=Δ=   (1) 
Then, Borjas manipulated this formula, in order to easily show immigration surplus as a fraction of national 
income,  
   2
2
1 sem
Q
QN −=Δ   (2) 
where s is labor’s share of national income, e is the elasticity of factor price for labor and m is the fraction of 
the work force that is foreign born. (m=G/M) 
 
But, this immigration surplus formula fails to include the skill differentials that exist both within and across 
the natives and foreign workers. As Korea has accepted large pool of the unskilled workers, a government 
can formulate the policies to admit certain classes of workers. Immigration surplus can be maximized when 
immigrants are complements with other factors of production; it is our interest to know whether the surplus 
would be enlarged if we assume native and immigrant workers are different in their skill. 
 
Second formula suggested by Borjas takes this into account. Labor force is divided into skilled workers and 
unskilled ones. The portion of skilled workers in the native population is b, and the respective portion in 
immigrants is marked as β. The complicate formula is, 
22
22
2
)1(
)1(
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2
1 mm
pp
bes
Q
Q
SS
SSSN −−
−−=Δ β   (3) 
where Ss  is the share of national income that accrues to skilled workers; SSe  is the elasticity of factor 
price for skilled workers; and Sp  is the fraction of the labor force that is composed of skilled workers.  
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Insofar as the skill composition of foreign workers are not identical to that of the natives (when b≠β), the 
computation will show positive results. So, once again, the more different two groups of workers in skill, the 
immigration surplus will be larger. 
 
Empirical Tests 
We already found out that immigrants in Korea are especially unskilled workers. These workers, who come 
from less developed countries such as China and Philippines, are supposed to do semi-skilled or non-skilled 
work in textile, machinery or others. Thus, our estimation of immigration surplus has three objectives. First, 
it is to measure how large the current size of immigration surplus is in Korea compared with prior study in 
the U.S. Second, we can test out whether importing the unskilled labor is more profitable than the skilled one, 
and finally, whether immigration has income transfer effects. 
 
Simple Immigration Surplus in Korea 
First, in order to calculate immigration surplus as a fraction of GDP, it needs to compute the values of each 
variable on a simple equation (2); s, e and m. Korea’s labor share in national income (the value of s) has 
been around 0.60 or 60%, when it is estimated in ratio of employee compensation to NI, but it tends to 
decrease from 0.642 in 1996 to 0.586 in 2000. As for the elasticity of factor price for labor (e), 
Hamermesh(1993)’s simple assumption is used to measure it. He describes, if there are only two factors of 
production (labor and capital), the value e must equal ( ) η/1 2s− , where η  is the output-constant elasticity 
of labor demand. Suppose η  is about –0.3 in Korea as Borjas used in his calculation on U.S. case, the 
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elasticity of factor price for labor becomes around –0.5. Since labor’s share in national income is decreasing; 
the absolute values in elasticity have increased over years. Finally, the fraction of foreigners in labor force 
(m) remains still low, 1% of labor force. But, the number of illegal workers cannot be reported accurately, so 
this figure can be a rough estimation. The values of each variable from 1996 are summarized in table 7. 
 
Table 7. Values of Each Variable in Equation (2) 
 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 
s 0.586 0.597 0.616 0.628 0.642 
e -0.571 -0.541 -0.492 -0.461 -0.427 
m  0.013 0.010 0.007 0.011 0.010 
Source: National Statistical Office, Ministry of Labor and others 
 
Immigration surplus only represents tiny portion of GDP. We can notice that the sum of immigration surplus 
is proportional to foreign labor fraction in workforce. Dramatic increase in surplus in 2000 seems to partly 
come from large share of immigrants (higher m), while exceptionally low economic gains in 1998 result 
from subsequent lower labor demand after the 1997 economic crisis, and sluggish economic activities in 
East Asia. (Table 8) 
 
Table 8. Immigration Surplus in Korea 
 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 
Surplus, 
% in GDP 
0.0028 0.0016 0.0007 0.0017 0.0013 
Surplus in billion won 13.3 7.0 2.8 7.2 5.2 
 
This amount is still small compared to Borjas’ calculation for the U.S., which equals to 0.1% of GDP. The 
major factor in cross-country difference lies in the minor portion of immigrants in Korean labor force.  
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Because a fraction of foreigners in labor force (m) is squared in the equation, 10 times larger share of 
immigrants in a country leads to 100 times differences in surplus scale. However, suppose the fraction of 
foreigners in labor share is equal both in the U.S. and Korea such as 0.1, immigration surplus will be larger 
in Korea. Even though the Korea’s share of labor (s) is relatively small, bigger absolute value of elasticity 
for labor (e) promises higher returns. It means when labor supply increases, the wage level falls far greater in 
Korea than in the U.S. In other words, the elasticity of factor price gets larger (in absolute value) when the 
labor demand curve becomes inelastic, and the natives can assess the higher benefits from immigration when 
the more labor and capital are complementary. This issue will be briefly discussed in the following sections. 
Anyway, under this simple assumption, Korea can possibly get much more profits by accepting foreign 
workers than the traditional immigrant destination of the U.S.  
 
Skill Differentials among Labor Force 
Evidently, labor force is composed of diverse skill groups, and their contribution to economic gains may 
differ. As was done by Borjas in equation (3), we can expect the larger benefits when Korea accepts 
exclusively skilled or exclusively unskilled workers, assuming that 50% of natives are skilled and capital 
does not play anything in production. The difference between Korea and the U.S. is that the immigration 
surplus is relatively small in Korea due to currently low fraction of foreign workers in labor force (small 
value of m). These low gains are denoted as flatter dotted line in figure 5. 
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Figure 5. The Immigration Surplus and Immigrant Skills, in a Model without Capital 
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Complementarities between capital and labor 
When Korea decides to import only skilled foreigners, immigration surplus as a fraction of GDP can be 
given by, 
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where Ss  is the share of income that goes to skilled workers, SSe  is the elasticity of factor price for skilled 
workers, and Sp  is the fraction of skilled labor force.  
 
On the other hand, in case that Korea accepts only unskilled immigrants, which is more close to the current 
skill composition of guest workers, the surplus can be denoted as, 
2
22
1 m
p
es
Q
Q
U
UUUN −=Δ   (5) 
where Us  is the share of income that goes to unskilled workers, UUe  is the elasticity of factor price for 
unskilled workers, and Up  is the fraction of unskilled labor force. (Borjas, 1994) 
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In a real world, however, capital plays an important part in the production process. If a native-owned capital 
shapes the relative gains to skilled and unskilled migrants’ flows in a different ways, policy suggestions for 
immigration may be changed. Hamermesh, (1993) said that the elasticity of factor price is greater for skilled 
workers than for unskilled ones ( SSe > UUe ). But it is well noted that the bigger elasticity for factor price is, 
the larger the immigration surplus will be, and it further means that skilled workers are more complementary 
with other factors of production such as capital. When skilled workers turn out more complementary with 
capital than unskilled workers, immigration surplus will be maximized by allowing skilled labor import in a 
condition that half of native workers are skilled. Thus, Korean immigration policy should be rectified to 
correct the currently 6% of skilled foreigners in total labor inflow.  
 
It is a conventional wisdom that skilled workers can be more complementary with capital since the price of 
capital goods such as computers is going down during recent decades. (Ehrenberg, 2000) However, it is not 
always true in Korea where its traces of economic development are a bit different from those of developed 
countries. Krugman and Obstfeld (1994) said, in international trades, the U.S. have comparative advantages 
on high-tech industries, which requires massive capital investment in R&D, but disadvantages on mass 
production, since rapidly industrializing countries copy the technologies once made within a couple of years, 
and produce them in mass in cheap factor prices including labor. Korean economy has followed technology 
duplication policies for decades and has exported manufacturing products as good as those in developed 
economies. So, different from that in the U.S. and Western European countries, Korean capital stock may not 
be fit for skilled workers who will use innovated technologies, but for relatively unskilled ones who can 
operate the machinery. 
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In B. Lee’s study (1995) on substitutability among workers with diverse skills and capital, he found that in 
three manufacturing industries; textile, chemistry and fabricated metal products in Seoul, skilled male 
workers are substitutes for capital (the coefficients are largely negative in table 9). But most importantly, 
capital is significantly complementary with unskilled labor and immigrants. In fewer than 50 employee size 
firms, unskilled workers and immigrants become complements with capital in a 99% significance level. The 
size of coefficients for complementarity gets the largest when below 100 person SMEs are estimated. (As for 
the unskilled immigrants, the coefficients are 0.827 in all size, 0.955 below 100 persons, and 0.946 fewer 
than 50 person size firms) 
 
Table 9. Partial Elasticity of Complementarities in Three Manufacturing Industries in Seoul by Firm Size 
 
We cannot definitely conclude that unskilled immigrants are complement with capital based on that single 
research. But his case study leaves a possibility that the elasticity of factor price may not be greater for 
skilled workers than for unskilled workers (or SSe  gets smaller than UUe ). Contrary to Hamermesh’s 
prediction, it becomes also feasible that importing unskilled workers can be more beneficial. We cannot but 
open this question unanswered until another detailed work is done. Nevertheless, as Korea has been 
interested in R&D and technology oriented development, accepting exclusively skilled foreigners may bring 
more profits some day in the future. 
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However, let alone demand side factors we will discuss in the next part such as dual labor market structure 
and external effects, it is almost indispensable to accept the unskilled foreign workers on the labor supply 
side as well. Under the Roy Model of self-selection for immigration, the reason that unskilled labor inflow is 
dominant comes from the low rate of return to skill in Korea. If sending countries’ income inequality is 
larger than the income distribution in the receiving country, unskilled labor inflow can be expected. Low-
income disparity for skills in Korea, even though it is increasing nowadays, supports that it is not an easy 
policy decision to change the skill composition of immigrant flow. As long as the returns to skill are 
relatively small, skilled foreigners will be reluctant to work in Korea. If Korean government tries to ban the 
unskilled labor inflow on a belief that immigration surplus will be magnified by allowing skilled labor 
import, the total supply of immigrants will dramatically fall, and the amount of immigration surplus as well. 
 
Redistribution 
As is discussed in theoretical part, immigration surplus is based on the wage fall due to immigrant labor 
inflow. So, workers can earn less, while capital owners earn more. Native workers lose their income by 
W0BFW1 in figure 4, but it goes to the capitalists’ pockets together with the triangle ABW0 derived from 
immigrants. Capital owners get the W0BCW1 in total. The transfer of wealth can be depicted by the 
following formulas. 
)1( msem
Q
QW −=Δ  (6) 
)
2
11( msem
Q
QC −−=Δ  (7) 
(6) indicates the net change in income of the native workers as a fraction of GDP (or W0BFW1), and (7) for 
capitalists (W0BCW1). 
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When Korean data are inputted, the size are supposed, 
Table 10. Amount of Redistribution as a Fraction of GDP in Korea  (%) 
 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 
Q
QWΔ  -0.4293 -0.3197 -0.2106 -0.3149 -0.2713 
Q
QCΔ  0.4322 0.3213 0.2114 0.3167 0.2727 
 
Native workers lose around 0.4% of GDP, or 2,044 billion won in 2000. It is a huge loss for the part of 
native workers enough to distort the labor market incentives to work. But, on the other hand, since capital 
owners try to get more benefits by using cheap labor, they will invest their additional profits to expand their 
industries. This possibility can predict not only more job opportunities but the re-increase of wage in fixed 
labor supply economy as well. This issue will be issued when discussing external effects in the following 
part. 
 
So far, we have talked about immigration surplus in Korea under the Borjas’ theoretical framework, and we 
found that 1% unskilled labor import have contributed to slightly less than 0.002% in a Korean economy 
during the latter half of the 1990s. This impact seems to come from low percentage of immigrants in Korean 
labor market. If their fraction increases, foreigners will bring large surplus because of high elasticity of 
factor price for labor. But it cannot be concluded that which way is more beneficial between importing more 
skilled workers and maintaining unskilled immigrants’ current inflow under the uncertain role of capital. We 
do not either clearly know whether the transfer of income from workers to capitalists show positive or 
negative signs on labor market.  
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However, it is certain that Korea can get benefits by allowing foreign workers in sum. We have discussed so 
far the immigration surplus on the assumption that immigrants receive the same amount of wages with the 
natives in a same skill level. But in a real Korean situation, guest workers earn less than Koreans. Employers 
in SMEs do not pay market price wages because foreign trainees are not ‘workers’ in a legal standard, and 
that illegal workers cannot appeal to the court against low payment due to their weak legal status. Suppose 
that unskilled foreigners earn about 80% of the native wages (as it costs for a foreign trainee), capitalists can 
get more from FCMN in figure 4. As for the Koreans, they may be delighted to extract a bit more from 
foreigners. But immigrants are a weak minority that needs protection. Even though they come to Korea for 
their benefits, it is also true that they contribute to Korean economic development. On the humanitarian 
perspectives, we cannot let them exposed to maltreatment and labor exploitation in expense for Korea’s bad 
reputation of enslaving unskilled immigrants who are out of legal protection and social securities. On a long-
term economic view, when it is internationally publicized that guest workers are exploited, future job seekers 
in foreign countries change their destination for work to other countries such as Taiwan or Japan. By 
blocking future labor inflow, Korea will get smaller immigration surplus than otherwise would. As long as 
immigration surplus can be derived even when immigrants earn in a competitive market wage level, both 
Koreans and immigrants accomplish Pareto Efficiency with an increased wealth for both groups. 
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Some Problems in Korean Case 
But, some problems reside in the calculation. Borjas’ immigration surplus assumes that immigration 
increases the economy’s labor stock. The immigration surplus model only supposes the way that a native 
owned capital stock has an effect on the relative gains to skilled and unskilled migrants. So, it fails to 
consider the case that immigrants themselves bring in capital. As Borjas predicted, if immigrants expand the 
capital stock as well as the size of the labor force by 100 percent, this would not alter the factor prices as 
long as the production function has constant returns to scale. An immigration policy, for example, Business 
Investor Category lies in that case. In order to immigrate to New Zealand, the foreign applicants should 
bring in at least NZ 750,000 (or US$ 312,000) under the condition that he/she invests in new business in a 
hosting region. But this case does not happen in Korea. First, most of immigrants are categorized to the poor 
and unskilled. They come to Korea to gain their bread. Second, Korean government does not pursue such 
kinds of investor visa policy. 
 
Another, but more serious problem is; immigration surplus arises based upon that immigrants lower the 
wages of native workers. But many studies found out that immigrant inflows do not reduce the earnings of 
the natives. For example, David Card (1990) researched whether the Mariel boatlift on the Miami of 1980 
had influenced the Miami labor market. On April 20, 1980, Castro government in Cuba declared that Cubans 
who wish to go to the U.S. can leave from the port, Mariel; as a result, around 125,000 Cuban immigrants 
arrived in Miami from May to September 1980 and about half of them decided to remain there. This result 
was the dramatic increase in the labor force by 7%. Succinctly, the experiment says the Mariel immigration 
has negligible impact on wages in Miami labor market.  
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Unfortunately, the available data cannot be found in Korea. But theoretical work (Song, 1997; B. Lee, 1995; 
Uh & H. Kwon 1995) predicts guest workers will not greatly reduce the wages of native Korean workers. 
How this could happen? That might be one reason that immigration surplus is usually small. Nevertheless, 
even though immigrants do not have an impact on the earnings of native workers, it does not mean that 
immigration has little impact on natives’ current and future employment opportunities. Since the opportunity 
problems imply quite opposite policy directions on immigration, it is worthy of discussing. The following 
part may let us trace them in diverse ways. 
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Beyond Immigration Surplus 
Immigration surplus and Dual Labor Market Theory 
Immigration surplus only explains that labor import is profitable for the economy, while dual labor market 
theory deals with the causes of labor flow. But these two have some similarities that these models divide 
labor market into two: skilled and unskilled jobs. At this point, it should be clarified whether Korean labor 
market is really segmented so as to support our previous presumptions and discussions. But it is another 
question to suggest that this dual labor market structure does not pose impediments on the natives’ 
employment opportunities. 
 
As we already mentioned on the causes of the immigration, wage differentials between large and SMEs have 
been widened in Korea. A worker in a firm with more than 500 employees earned 741,000 won per month 
compared to 549,000 won (or 74%) with 10-29 employees in 1990, but the wage rate grew 2,195,000 won 
versus 1,497,000 (68%) in 2000. (Figure 6.) The causes of this wage disparity have been derived from 
market factors (increased labor demand but decreased supply) as well as dual labor market structure of 
unionism. 
 
Figure 6. Wage Level by Establishment Size 
 
But how the wage differentials in each firm size are related to skill differentials? There have been two 
distinctive trends in demands of labor. First is, the proportion of SMEs in manufacturing employment has 
increased since the mid-1970s, but, secondly, each firm in different size demands different types of skilled 
workers. (Lee, 1999) For example, the portion of large companies with more than 500 employees in 
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manufacturing employment has decreased from 45.3% to 29.5% from 1978 to 1998, while the corresponding 
portion of SMEs in manufacturing employment with 10-99 regular workers has increased from 24.3% to 
45.1%. (Lee, Moh and Kim, 2001) This increasing share of SMEs in manufacturing employment was not 
noticed in any other advanced country. However, most employment in SMEs still has been concentrated 
among light industries such as beverage, textile, and rubber. It is a unique situation in terms that large 
companies in Korea have transformed their export business from light to heavy industries, which demand 
highly productive and skilled workers. The expansion of service industry also has drained labor reserve in 
manufacturing sectors. It definitely contrasts with SMEs’ situation to seek cheap, large pool of labor. In sum, 
demand patterns between large firms and SMEs came to differ in quantity as well as in quality. 
 
On the supply side, the decline of young people is responsible for the overall increasing wage rate. Labor 
supply cannot meet the rapidly elevating labor demand like in Korea that has pursued export-oriented growth. 
Thus, wage level for the unskilled workers has been raised steeply. The wages for those who completed 
middle school or less has augmented two and half times from 1990 to 2000. (Figure 7) 
 
180
190
200
210
220
230
240
Middle School
or less
High School
Graduates
Junior College
Graduates
College
Graduates
and More
Source: The Profile of Korean Human Assets, KLI,
2001
Figure 7. Wage Increase Rate by Educational Attainment (%)
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Even though wage increase is lager among the unskilled workers, the wage disparity by firm size largely 
results from the human resources accumulations. After the 1980 reform in entry quota of university, the 
number of highly skilled has increased in labor market, while the decreasing enrollment in vocational high 
schools has diminished the number of intermediately skilled workers that SMEs usually need most. 
Moreover, large firms can provide expensive firm training as their scales permit to pay the costs. Therefore, 
workers with similar level of education and age will get different wages in the long run whether they can 
access training programs or not. The consequence is a difference in productivity. (Lee, 1999) 
 
The level of productivity in SMEs had remained around 60% in the early 1970s compared with large 
enterprises, but it dropped to 39% in 1995. In order to discourage the productivity gap, SMEs should offer 
training and high wages as well, but large firms already raised the market wage so high that SMEs cannot 
afford to pay. The other choice is to get certain skill level of workers from vocational high schools, but the 
low enrollment and poor level of education have blocked it. (Lee, 1999) SMEs came only to attract low 
skilled workers who are willing to accept extremely low wages, but since they cannot get regular workers at 
market wages, they might use part-time or fixed-term workers. And this definitely leads to a vicious circle of 
further deteriorating productivity, discontinuities in production and so forth. 
 
However, the market factors are a little bit short of explaining the rapid wage dispersion after 1987. With 
democratization, unions were legalized and they had more power to negotiate their wage level. The problem 
lies in that the unionism is limited on regular as well as male and production workers in large enterprises 
with more than 1,000 workers. (Table 11.) Large firms, esp. so called Chaebols, have got economic rent 
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under strong government protection, and employees sought part of it as an increase in wage when they could 
successfully form an internal labor market by using strong labor movements. Thus, wage differentials tend to 
be more widened whether there is economic rent to share and strong unionism to seek it.  
 
Table 11. Unionization by Establishment Size (1993) 
Firm Size (employees) Rate (%) Firm Size Rate 
10-29 0.9 500-999 37.5 
30-99 5.4 1,000-4,999 59.6 
100-299 26.3 5,000-15,000 62.1 
300-499 36.4 15,000 76.0 
Source: Lee and Kim (2000) 
 
The threat effect of unionization suggests another explanation of labor market segmentation. If an owner is 
afraid that their workers are organized to protest against him, he will be generous enough to pay as high 
wages as prevalent in similar size and types of unionized firms. That threat effect will be overwhelming if, 
and where unionism is dominant. That is why large firms usually have ended up with high level of wage rate. 
(Nam, 1999) High wage costs for their workers, in turn, let employers to choose subcontract or outsource 
part of their production to SMEs. Another problem is that dependent SMEs usually conduct simple repeated 
works that innovative ideas are not required. If subcontractors need to perform solely simple works, demand 
for high skills and skilled workers will be absent, and the business progress is limited. (Lee and Kim, 2000) 
It provides a different cause that new labor market entrants avoid to work, or, even they started to work, 
show high job separation rates in SMEs. 
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All these long explanations conclude that Korean labor market is divided into large companies (or skilled 
workers) and SMEs (or unskilled workers), and the deficiency for the unskilled labor in SMEs is a kind of 
indispensable and structural side effect on the way of development. Cheap and unskilled native workers are 
not abundant enough to provide sufficient labor that SMEs can afford to buy. The share of skilled workers in 
workforce is increasing, but SMEs fails to attract them, or apparently, they even do not want them. As for the 
workers, they prefer large companies that give them positive feedbacks of higher wages and productivity. We 
cannot imagine, in segmented Korean labor market conditions, the unskilled immigrants deprive the places 
of the natives in work places. It does not need to show again the labor shortage rate by firm size presented in 
table 1, but the following data on related-production labor shortages fully describes the reality that the 
smaller the firm size is, the more difficult to find workers (or the smaller the number of job applicants), even 
when total labor shortage has been reduced in 2000. 
 
Table 12. Related Production Labor Shortage Rate by Firm Size (%) 
 10-29  30-99 100-299 300-499 500 + Total 
1994 11.9 8.3 4.1 2.5 1.5 5.4 
2000 3.69 2.28 2.09 0.89 0.40 2.02 
Source: Report on the Labor Demand Survey, Ministry of Labor, Corresponding year 
 
Table 13. Related Production Labor Shortage Rate by Skill Level in 1998 (%) 
 Supervisory 
Skilled 
Workers 
Skilled 
Workers 
Semi-Skilled 
Workers 
Unskilled 
Workers 
Total 
All Size of 
establishment 
0.7 0.8 1.3 2.6 1.0 
SMEs (10-299 
persons) 
1.1 1.1 1.9 3.8 1.4 
Source: Report on the Labor Demand Survey 1998, Ministry of Labor 
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Song (1999) provides other kind of support on that cheap, unskilled labor supply is in short. He conducted 
extensive surveys on firms that use foreign trainees. Around 270 sample SMEs with 5-299 employees over 
different regions and industries responded. When looking into the responses that how to fulfill labor shortage, 
above half of the employers answered they will hire immigrants. 
 
Table 14. How Employers Respond to Labor Shortage 
 Retired Natives Foreign Workers Active Natives Others Total 
Responses 38 145 81 8 272
Percentage 14.0 53.3 29.8 2.9 100.0
Source: Song, KIET, 1999 
 
In table 15, the responses are categorized in detail by industries. Outstanding portion of 74% in metal 
products industry, which frequently requires physically hard work, prefer foreign workforce. 
 
Table 15. How Employers Respond to Labor Shortage by Industries 
 
As for the retirees, low physical strength to support hard, labor-intensive work can be a reason that 
employers are reluctant to recruit. Whereas, as for the active working population, high market wage rate but 
low financial capability to afford them is an impediment. So, Song raised another question that, if 
government promises a subsidy in order that employers can purchase native workers in market price, how 
much extra money per head/month the subsidy costs. 33% responded 300,000 won/month, and 25.5% 
400,000 won/month. This amount is huge in sum for government, and even if it is feasible, market distortion 
will definitely appear in forms of growing tax burdens that lower real wages; thus, provide disincentives for 
work among the native labor force,  
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So, it is quite instructive that employers in SMEs use immigrants mostly because they cannot find workers 
who are willing to receive low wages. (Table 16) 
 
Table 16. Reasons to Use Foreign Workers 
 Responses (1) Percentage Responses (2) Percentage 
Lack of Native Applicants 85 41.7 68 63.6
Low Wages 54 26.5 34 31.8
Higher Productivity 23 11.3 4 3.7
Others 42 20.5 1 0.9
Total 204 100.0 107 100.0
Source: (1) Song, KIET, 1993, (2) Park, Korea Small Business Institute, 1994 
 
In addition, the fact that native workers prefer service to manufacturing work, such as hotels, restaurants and 
others, add another reason SMEs are difficult to fulfill labor shortage. Moreover, most plants are located 
outside the metropolitan areas. The large commuting costs only add fixed costs of working for the urban 
natives (B. Lee and J. Kwon, 1997). On the other hand, newly arrived immigrants have advantages to freely 
settle down near plants, and subsequent low commuting costs increase the incentives to overnight work.  
 
Under these complicated market situations of labor shortage and high price, it is possibly imaginable that 
unskilled immigrants serve Korean economic activities, which otherwise did not work well. Dual labor 
market structure in Korea has attracted foreign labor, whether we want it or not, and further it suggests 
immigrants may have different labor markets that natives do not prefer. 
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External Effects 
Since labor demand and supply influence each other, labor market equilibrium changes throughout time. We 
can imagine how these changes positively affect the job opportunities among the native workers. Figure 4 
showed graphically how the increase in labor supply leads to immigration surplus. But when immigrants 
earn money, they spend some of them in a host country. They purchase necessities or some entertainments, 
such as their local foods, books or videos of own language, so they open different kinds of shops, which 
might interest some natives as well.  
 
In figure 8-1, increased wealth for the natives (or immigration surplus) and new incomes of immigrants 
permit whole workers to have more purchasing power, and they will demand more products in output market. 
Product demand curve moves to the right (from D to D’) and the price for goods will rise. In response, 
employers will urge to get more workers in order to produce more output. The demand for labor will be 
enlarged, and labor demand curve will shift to the right to D” in figure 8-2. Under the excess labor demand 
situation, firms will offer higher wage to get more workers unless labor supply extends faster than the 
demand. (In case that labor supply is fixed, only wages go up.) We can imagine that the wage increase, 
caused by this external effect, may partly offset the initial wage fall at the entry of immigrants. The increased 
labor demand may provide a basis that wage fall cannot be easily detected, and immigrants do not deprive 
the natives of job opportunities in the real world.  
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External effects also can be measured as a fraction of GDP by using the other formula, and it is given by,  
)1(
12
1 2 smsmsem
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QN −−
⋅+−=Δ γ
γ  (8) 
each variable denotes same values when we calculate the immigration surplus, but γ  means the percentage 
change in the marginal product of labor or capital that derives from a percentage change in total product 
(assuming γ >0). The first term, as we are familiar with, indicates the initial immigration surplus, while the 
second term describes the increase in the value of natives’ aggregate output that owes to external effects. 
(Borjas, 1994) 
 
For instance, in using year 2000 data, if the elasticity of marginal product with respect to aggregate output 
(or γ ) is 0.05, the external effects (or second term) will increase the national income that accrues to natives 
by 0.04 %, or 189.5 billion won. By adding the value of first term, the total contribution of foreign workers 
to native income will reach to 202.8 billion won. However, under this estimate, external effects cannot 
possibly recompense native workers’ loss, caused by income transfer to capital owners of 2,044 billion won. 
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In the absence of any evidence supporting their existence and sizable magnitude, it is hard to say external 
effects positively affect the economic growth. On the contrary, adverse shocks can occur because using 
cheap labor of immigrants can sluggish industry restructuring. When unskilled labor and capital are 
substitutes, employers invest less in capital by using more labor. This tendency in the long run deteriorates 
capital stock. B. Lee and J. Kwon (1997) state that, in case of Seoul, guest workers are substitutes for capital 
esp. in textile industry. (Table 17) So, when employers avoid capital investment and use large share of labor, 
this relative dependency on labor makes the textile industry latent on restructuring and innovation. The 
whole industry gets to lose international competitiveness and its output market. At the end, the lower output 
will lead to lower employment both on immigrants and natives. But this symptom does not appear in 
chemistry and fabricated metal product. Whether external effects or adverse shocks they are, no significant 
proof is not yet disclosed how much they affect the labor market. 
 
Table 17. Partial Elasticity of Complementarities by Three Manufacturing Industries in Seoul 
 
Local Employment Opportunities 
So far, we have discussed how the employment opportunities can be affected under the gross picture of 
whole national economy. But, we can imagine the case that some specific regions may be severely damaged 
in terms of overall wage level and job opportunities because immigration tends to be concentrated on several 
metropolitan and industrial areas. There are three views on the ways immigration can influence on the local 
employment opportunities.  
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Immigrant Inflow leads to Native Outflow 
Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1996) conducted a U.S. regional comparison research in order to analyze the 
impact of immigration on wages. They tested, as the fraction of unskilled immigrants increases, what would 
happen on native wages controlling for age and education. The first cross-section impact of immigration 
between immigrant intensive and non-intensive areas says immigrant labor supply did not make a serious 
impact on the wage level of the equivalent natives. On the second test, they used first-difference regression 
analysis on immigrant intensive area. When wages for an area-education group were regressed, immigration 
induced large falls in pay. As the number of unskilled immigrants increased, native wages for high school 
dropouts decreased. What made these two test results different is the first static approach missed one 
important point that labor can move almost freely within a boarder.  
 
When the unskilled immigrants arrive in a region, the increased labor supply lowers their wage level. But 
they can get much profit even by accepting lowered wages in a host country since they are from 
economically unfavorable countries with extremely low payment. The losers are, however, the natives. 
Because of decreasing returns on labor, they may choose not to work, or they will move to another region 
where the wage level is still high in the absence of immigrant arrivals. It is quite feasible because the 
mobility costs are low within a country. Information on available jobs is easily accessible within a border; 
where infrastructure on transportation and telecommunication is well built. 
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This probability is supported by a factor proportion analysis of the effects of immigration on native wages. 
The increase of unskilled labor leads to the wage falling among those who did not complete high school 
courses. (Borjas, Freeman and Katz, 1996) As labor supply increases, the wage for that group decreases. 
When the uprooted natives move to other regions and get jobs, they can recover the prior income in a new 
place. In a national dimension, the total wealth expands as more workers participate in production, but in 
reality the job opportunities for the natives diminishes with a tide of immigrant flow.  
 
In the absence of empirical tests, the correlation between immigrant inflow and native outflow in a certain 
local area is not uncovered in Korea, but we can guess by enumerating two cases. Karibongdong in southern 
area in Seoul is named as little Yanbian (the north-east region of the Mainland where Chinese Koreans live 
together.). Some forty Chinese shops are opened on streets of five hundred meters, and 10,000 Chinese 
Koreans are supposed to settle down around there. Situated in Gu-Ro district, it was a traditional industrial 
area with plenty of low-income native workers for several decades. Taken into account less than a decade 
history of labor inflow from the Mainland China, it is astonishing change of labor composition. Another case 
is Ansan city, which is also typical industrial zone. In a so-called ‘Borderless Street’, people can find 
Chinese, Bangladesh and Philippine stores. Starting from 1997, 7,000 people from different nations have 
formed a small international society of the unskilled workers. Wongokbondong, the center of this society, 
had 30,000 native Korean residents before 1997, but now the number shrinks to 19,000. This native outflow 
is still going on. It is undeniable that, consistent with a ‘skating rink’ model of native location decisions for 
Borjas et al.; new immigrants may knock a native off the ice.  
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Immigrants Enhance the Natives’ Opportunities 
We remember from the end of second part in this paper that Mariel boatlift immigration flow did not lower 
the Miamians’ wage level. That fact lets us to impose a hint on whether immigration does not deprive the 
natives of employment opportunities. The same Mariel case indicates these Cubans did not reduce the 
employment level esp. the unskilled jobs in Miami. One possible explanation is, as is discussed right before, 
the Mariels might displaced other workers to other places out of Miami. Card (1990) did not exclude this 
possibility, but he prefers the other explanation that the growth of labor-intensive industries facilitated the 
rapid absorption of the Mariel immigrants. The traditional immigration destinations like Miami usually 
contains immigrant-intensive industries like textile, food and beverage, or hotels and motels that require 
large number of the unskilled or intermediately skilled workers. Due to the specific industrial structure, on 
the arrival of massive labor force, Miami was already prepared to receive them.  
 
As the dual labor market structure suggests, SMEs in Korea have needed cheap, unskilled labor for more 
than a decade. Whether it is caused by either demand or supply factors, Korean labor market has been ready 
to accept the new labor force. Both Karibongdong in Seoul and Wongokbondong in Ansan have many SMEs. 
We can now turn our previous assumption to other direction. Immigrants may not expel the natives from the 
regions, but they fulfill these places; otherwise, being vacant. Contrary to the previous argument by Borjas et 
al., a recent research finds, from Censuses on 119 U.S. metropolitan statistical areas in 1970, 1980, and 1990, 
the increase in immigrants in a certain skill level initiates small increase in the population of the natives of 
the similar skill group. (Card and DiNardo, 2000) They conclude unskilled immigration inflow is absorbed 
as the industry structures rapidly adjust themselves to the changed number and skill composition of local 
 41
labor force. When the immigrants get more hired, it probably leads to more employment among the natives 
due to the weak but definite complementarities between the two groups. 
 
Immigrants and Natives Have Their Own Job Markets 
The last local model is based on sociological findings. Contrary to the first one, this assumes labor markets 
are spatially closed by local experience and place-based knowledge. Once a first group of immigrants arrives 
in a specific place, they take part in that local economy by having jobs most available for their skills. Since 
immigrants are ignorant on information in the host country, they can only retain knowledge on their local 
market and their first types of jobs. This limited information goes back to the sending country through the 
nexus of families and friends; second or third waves of immigrants start to move in that specific regional 
market, just like did Koreans in Los Angeles, Chinese in San Francisco and Puerto Ricans in New York in 
the U.S. Then, the number of immigrants becomes large enough to establish an ethnic community where 
closure is strengthened. But as the closure limits their contacts with outsiders, same group of immigrants 
routinely participate in similar kinds of work that their first comers used to do even when market conditions 
in a host country changes along time. A significant minority society builds a labor market, different from that 
for the natives, which usually but strangely ends up with low returns on human capital. (Sassen, 1995) 
 
Similar cases can be noticed in Korea as well. Chinese Koreans in Karibongdong and Bangladesh and 
Pakistanis in Ansan will be a good example in another way. It is not the same case, but, for example, 
Philippines gather every Sunday in Hewha Cathedrale in Dongsungdong, Seoul, and open flea markets of 
Philippine products. They are supposed to share information on jobs and wages, and most of job change 
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decisions are made in each ethnic community. According to a 1995 survey on job decisions among 185 
foreign workers in Korea (Seol, 1999), around 52% workers get an information on the current job from 
compatriot friends, relatives or agencies, while the rest through Koreans they know. But the interesting point 
is that the longer they stay in Korea, they heavily rely on their friends (66%), not on job agencies (13%). 
This means immigrants in Korea use local and informal network of information and communication for their 
economic activities.  
 
Since immigrants respond to their own systems of job decisions, native local market conditions do not affect 
the immigrants’ flow. Thus, immigrants can get the jobs even where native unemployment level is high, and 
in declining industrial areas. (Sassen, 1995) From this argument, we can deduct that immigrants and natives 
can conflict for the same jobs by chance, but immigrant inflow does not mostly influence on the natives’ 
employment as well as wages because they compete for certain jobs among themselves. An empirical study 
on foreign workers in Seoul (B. Lee, 1995) provides another feedback that foreigners are significantly strong 
substitutes for other foreign workers, not for the natives, esp. in SMEs. (Table 9.) 
 
But we cannot easily conclude which model is right, since local labor market responses on immigration are 
multifaceted, so the three models are also partially true. Moreover, there are many different kinds of theories 
and models on this issue. But except the first one- immigration inflow leads to native outflow- the other 
models agree on that immigration does not greatly reduce the natives’ job opportunities. Sociology stresses 
much on social behaviors of different groups, but economics concentrates on that segmented labor structures 
and subsequent economic expansion allow positive impacts on both immigrants and natives. 
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Conclusion 
Summary 
Throughout the whole paper, we found out that labor inflow in Korea has expanded over a decade. The 
increase of unskilled immigrants, who are composed of trainees and illegal workers, has dramatically 
exceeded that of skilled ones during the 1990s. Mostly coming from underdeveloped, other Asian 
neighborhood, they work in small, manufacturing factories where native Koreans no more want to work.  
 
In the following part, immigration surplus in Korea was estimated under the Borjas’ theoretical framework, 
and found that 1% unskilled labor import has contributed to a bit less than 0.002% increase in GDP in the 
latter half of the 1990s. This small impact results mostly from low percentage of immigrant presence in 
Korean labor market. If their portion increases, foreigners will bring larger surplus because of high elasticity 
of factor price for labor. Even though there are some disputes on desirable level of immigrants’ skill or the 
effect of income redistribution, it is agreed that immigrants play an important role in economic activities. 
 
On the examination of immigration impact on natives’ employment opportunities, we cannot easily conclude 
which model is more close to the real picture of current Korean labor market, but many models agree on that 
immigration does not greatly reduce the natives’ job opportunities. Economic theories strongly suggest that 
segmented labor market structures and after-immigration economic expansion can predict positive impacts 
on both immigrants and natives. 
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All these observations depict Korea is being transformed into multinational society, and this wave seems not 
to be held back any more. Due to the short history as an immigrant destination, the strong presence of 
immigration surplus is not well detected; however, we can expect this kind of benefits to be enlarged, as 
immigrants constitute a sizeable pillar of Korean economic activities. This finding, therefore, suggests the 
further policy implications on Korean immigration policies. 
 
Korean Government Policies on Foreign Workers 
Current Situations 
In Korea, there is no legally admitted employment except in reporting, business, technology transfer, capital 
investment, education and research, and entertainment. The unskilled immigrants are either trainees in 
Industrial trainee program or illegal workers. When unskilled labor first started to enter around 1987, Korea 
had no policy on them, but, since 1994, the Program has been in practice. There have been frequent changes 
on the size of trainees, the length of training period, and employers’ qualifications such as firm size, targeted 
business sectors or others. At any rate, guest workers arrive in Korea throughout 45 agencies in 14 sending 
countries to work in SMEs for two-year period. Korea Federation of Small Business (KFSB) takes whole 
processes from importing to sending them back through its affiliated Alien Training Cooperation Corps 
(ATCO). Moreover, in 1998, Trainee Employment System was enacted so that, after two year training and 
examination, foreigners are eligible to be a legally standardized ‘worker’ for a subsequent year. 
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But the new Trainee Employment System does not work well, since immigrants have no enough time to 
prepare the difficult qualification exams. Only 23% of the eligible trainees from 2000 to September 2001 
passed the exam and could stay for one more year. However, more serious problem lies in KFSB imposes 
too low wage rate on foreign trainees- 56% level compared to native workers in 1995, for instance. They try 
to exploit labor in a cheap price, and lower total costs of production to retain the international price 
competitiveness of products. Another problem is that training period is too short. Foreigners pay sizeable 
money to be a trainee, but two year training and low wages deter them from earning substantial profits they 
initially imagined. Thus, trainees leave their work places illegally to find other plants that offer higher 
returns for work. The firms who cannot afford the trainees due to the lack of entitlements, for their part, 
eagerly accept them even by offering higher wages to fulfill labor shortage. So, as illegal workers earn 
outstandingly more money (Table 18), more trainees give up their legal status in expense of higher returns, 
and actually 42.3% trainees did in 2000.  
 
Table 18. Immigrant Wages by Legal Status in 1995 (Won) 
 Monthly Wages 
Korean Origin, Illegal Workers (N=104) 829,608 
Other Illegal Workers (N=221) 574,829 
Trainees (N=68) 310,043 
Source: Uh and H. Kwon, 1995 N= Number of responses 
 
But it should be remembered that illegal workers can be exposed to late or non-payment and violence, since 
they are out of legal protections. Unfortunately, these cases are reported frequently. The immigrants’ human 
rights issues are really concerned let alone bad reputation for Korea in an international scene. 
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Policy Implications 
Even though net wages that trainees receive is small, getting a trainee costs about 80% of employing a native 
worker, according to Korea Labor Institute’s research in 1996. Employers pay some fees to KFSB in order to 
get trainees, and they provide meals and places to sleep because trainees are de jure invited in companies to 
acquire new skills and familiarize themselves with advanced technologies. On the abolition of Industrial 
trainee program, employers could dramatically cut these non-wage costs. When unskilled foreigners are 
approved as entitled workers, the social security benefits, accrued to them, may soar up to the equivalent 
natives’ level, but the reduced non-wage costs can offset these. Under the possibility that immigration 
surplus can exist even when immigrants and natives receive same amount of money, we can expect all the 
natives and foreign workers, and capital owners can get benefits from the legislated, unskilled labor import. 
 
Therefore, current government-level discussion on a new employment system for foreign workers may cure 
the existing labor problems. Ministry of Labor tries to implement a new law by allowing companies to hire 
directly foreign ‘workers’ for three years. Under the intended system, Ministry of Labor will issue working 
permits to foreigners in cooperation with the Ministry of Justice. They will get paid as much as the natives, 
and even be fully protected by Korean labor laws. But, when it is drafted at the end of June 2002 as 
scheduled, the size of surplus will not be greatly expanded since the size of entry quota is restricted to 1-
1.5% of domestic labor force. Under the current or new system, however, foreigners can only stay two or 
three years in workplace. It is too short for employers as well because workers return to their country when 
they are accustomed to their work and working conditions. The longer they stay, the higher their 
productivities will be.  
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Of course, there are negative aspects on opening unskilled labor immigration. If the share of immigrants is 
growing enough to form a sub society, it may harm the cooperation among workers or the whole social 
cohesion due to some intercultural misunderstandings or inter-group tensions just like Western economies 
have experienced. In extreme cases, the social agitation and instability may slow down the economic 
development. Moreover, immigrants also can be free riders in social security systems. For example, when a 
foreign ‘worker’ loses a job, he/she can eligibly receive unemployment insurance. However, well-devised 
immigration policies may minimize these side effects. Quota system, as is now devised, can block the 
increasing rate of immigrants. Anyway, under the labor standards, foreign workers can be protected from 
exploitation; in turn, they can pay back some of their wages by taxes to build social securities for their own 
and Korean co-workers.  
 
Lots of discussions, including this paper, have talked about the pros and cons on accepting foreign labor. But 
there are limits to measure the social impact by using one or two economic models. It is time to conduct an 
extensive, nation-wide research to calculate the multifaceted, socio-political economic surplus of 
immigration in order to adequately respond to a rapidly internationalizing Korean society and needs for 
transnational labor flows. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 2. Foreign Workers by Legal Status, 1987-2000 (person, (%)) 
 Total Formal Trainee Illegal* 
1987 6,409 2,192 (34.2) - 4,217 (65.8) 
1988 7,410 2,403 (32.4) - 5,007 (67.6) 
1989 14.610 2,474 (16.9) - 12,136 (83.1) 
1990 21,235 2,833 (13.3) - 18,402 (86.7) 
1991 45,449 2,973 (6.5) 599 (1.3) 41,877 (92.2) 
1992 73,868 3,395 (4.6) 4,945 (6.7) 65,528 (88.7) 
1993 66,323 3,767 (5.7) 8,048 (1.2) 54,508 (93.1) 
1994 77,546 5,265 (6.8) 24,050(31.0) 48,231 (62.2) 
1995 142,405 8,228 (5.8) 52,311(36.7) 81,866 (57.5) 
1996 210,494 13,420 (6.4) 68,020(32.3) 129,054(61.3) 
1997 245,399 15,900 (6.5) 81,451(33.2) 148,048(60.3) 
1998 157,689 11,143 (7.0) 47,009(29.8) 99,537 (63.2) 
1999 217,384 12,592 (5.8) 69,454(31.9) 135,338(62.3) 
2000 284,145 17702 (6.2)b 77,448(27.3) 188,995(66.5) 
b: including E-8 (Trainee employment) visa holders 
*The size of Illegal workers is calculated by estimating illegal foreign residents in Korea 
Source: Annual Report on Embark- and Disembarkation, Ministry of Justice, Korea, each year 
 
 
Table 3. Nationality, Brotherhood of Foreign Workers, 2000 (Top 10) 
Trainee Illegal Nationality Total 
Korean 1) Non-Korean Korean Non-Korean
China 125,706 11,423 17,237 57,348 38.277 
Philippine 22,870 0 7,498 0 12,890 
Indonesia 18,967 0 15,273 0 3,191 
Vietnam 18,398 0 10,170 0 7,772 
Bangladesh 17,651, 0 2,985 0 14,475 
Thailand 14,936 0 2,417 0 12,449 
Mongolia 13,562 0 412 0 13,088 
Uzbekistan2) 8,756 0 3,448 0 4,933 
Pakistan 7,992 0 1,891 0 6,054 
Sri Lanka 3,112 0 1,334 0 1,744 
Total 251,950 11,423 62,665 57,348 114,873 
* including formal workers  1) ‘Korean’ indicates Korea origins 2) Uzbek-Korean not separately counted 
Source: Annual Report on Embark- and Disembarkation 2000, Ministry of Justice, Korea, 
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Table 4. Foreign Trainees on Each Size of Firms, 1995 
Trainee Size of Firms 
(Number of employees) Number Percentage 
1-5 79 0.2 
6-10 1,081 3.8 
11-20 2,092 7.4 
21-50 7,929 28.3 
51-100 8,227 29.4 
101-200 5,470 19.5 
201-300 1,578 5.6 
Over 300 1,525 5.4 
Total 27,981 100.0 
Source: Korea Federation of Small and Medium Business, 1995 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Illegal Workers on Each Size of Firms, 1995 (%) 
Illegal Worker Size of Firms 
(N. of employees) 
Total 
Korean 1) Non-Korean 
1-4 4.8 17.1 5.0 
5-9 16.7 26.8 22.1 
10-29 40.6 31.7 54.8 
30-49 6.7 2.4 9.0 
50-99 9.2 12.2 4.5 
100-299 18.7 7.3 4.5 
Over 300 3.3 2.4 - 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
N. of cases 201 40 161 
1) ‘Korean’ indicates Korea origins 
Source: Seol, 1999 (edited) 
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Table 6. Employment by Industries, 1995  
Trainee Illegal Worker Industry 
Persons Percentage Persons Percentage
MANUFACTURING 27,981 100.0 8,984 98.2 
Food and beverage, tobacco 0 0.0 n.a. n.a. 
Textile, wearing, footwear 13,100 46.8 2,890 31.6 
Wood and wood products 257 0.9 896 9.8 
Paper, printing 970 3.5 - - 
Chemicals, plastic products 3,245 11.6 1,159 12.7 
Non-metallic mineral products 802 2.9 - - 
Basic metal products 1,028 3.7 n.a. n.a. 
Fabricated metal/ Machinery 7,824 28.0 1,949 21.3 
Furniture 755 2.7 n.a. n.a. 
Other manufacturing industries - - 2,090 22.9 
Construction 0 0.0 161 1.8 
Construction 0 0.0 161 1.9 
Total 27,981 100.0 9,145 100.0 
Source: Seol, 1999 (edited) 
Table 9. Partial Elasticity of Complementarities in Three Manufacturing Industries in Seoul by Firm Size 
Total M, S F, S M, U F, U Foreigners Capital 
Male, Skilled (M, S) 6240+      
Female, Skilled (F, S) -0.205+ -14**     
Male, Unskilled (M, U) -25000+ 1.27 100000**    
Female, Unskilled (F, U) -1.07+ 5.26** -2.84 -39.7**   
Foreigners 0.34+ 2.58** -0.443 3.6* -30.5**  
Capital -323+ 0.781** 1290** 0.59* 0.827* 16.6** 
Lee than 100 workers M, S F, S M, U F, U Foreigners Capital 
Male, Skilled 6088.76+      
Female, Skilled 0.293+ -14.5**     
Male, Unskilled -24400+ 4.32* 97800**    
Female, Unskilled 0.35+ 1.41* 1.49 -47**   
Foreigners 0.895+ 1.12 0.891 1.22 -31.3**  
Capital -315+ 0.922** 1260** 0.963 0.955** 16.2** 
Less than 50 workers M, S F, S M, U F, U Foreigners Capital 
Male, Skilled 6960+      
Female, Skilled 0.375+ -17.8**     
Male, Unskilled -24400+ 8.7** 85200**    
Female, Unskilled 0.393+ 1.39 3.74* -47.2**   
Foreigners 0.886+ 1.18* 1.17 1.2 -31.2**  
Capital -324+ 0.86** 1140** 0.939** 0.946** 14.9** 
Source: B. Lee (1995) ** 99% significance level, * 95% 
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Figure 6. Wage Level by Establishment Size
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Source: The Profile of Korean Human Assets, KLI, 2001 
 
 
Table 15. How Employers Respond to Labor Shortage by Industries (responses, (%)) 
 Retired Natives Foreign Workers Active Natives Others Total 
Beverage, Food 6 
(14.0) 
22 
(51.2) 
14 
(32.6) 
1 
(2.3) 
43 
(100.0) 
Textile 5 
(19.2) 
14 
(53.9) 
6 
(23.1) 
1 
(3.8) 
26 
(100.0) 
Non-Metallic Products 4 
(17,4) 
12 
(52.2) 
7 
(30.4) 
 23 
(100.0) 
Metal Products 3 
(13.0) 
17 
(73.9) 
2 
(8.7) 
1 
(4.4) 
23 
(100.0) 
Wood and Paper 3 
(13.0) 
8 
(34.8) 
10 
(43.5) 
2 
(3.3) 
23 
(100.0) 
Chemicals 3 
(5.0) 
34 
(56.7) 
21 
(35.0) 
2 
(3.3) 
60 
(100.0) 
Machinery and Electronics 5 
(12.5) 
23 
(57.5) 
11 
(27.5) 
1 
(2.5) 
40 
(100.0) 
Others 7 
(25.0) 
12 
(42.9) 
9 
(32.1) 
 28 
(100.0) 
Total 36 
(13.5) 
142 
(53.4) 
80 
(30.1) 
8 
(3.0) 
266 
(100.0) 
Source: Song, KIET, 1999 
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Table 17. Partial Elasticity of Complementarities by Three Manufacturing Industries in Seoul 
<Textile> M, S F, S M, U F, U Foreigners Capital 
Male, Skilled (M, S) -10.4*      
Female, Skilled (F, S) 0.865* -9.48**     
Male, Unskilled (M, U) 1.22 3.69 159000*    
Female, Unskilled (F, U) 0.658 1.76 0.797 -29.1   
Foreigners 3.9+ 4.88+ -99800+ 10.6+ 50900+  
Capital 0.791** 0.717* 1870* 0.435** -710+ 3.3* 
<Chemistry> M, S F, S M, U F, U Foreigners Capital 
Male, Skilled 90000+      
Female, Skilled 2.2+ -33.7**     
Male, Unskilled -18000+ 0.311 36200*    
Female, Unskilled 1.82+ -0.597* 1.36 -95.1*   
Foreigners 2.14+ -0.409* 1.69 3.06* -45*  
Capital -429+ 1.00 853* 0.875* 0.804* 20.5* 
<Fabricated Metal> M, S F, S M, U F, U Foreigners Capital 
Male, Skilled 7920+      
Female, Skilled 0.535+ -46.60*     
Male, Unskilled -40200+ -4.46* 161000*    
Female, Unskilled -0.451+ 1.59 -3.72* -301*   
Foreigners 0.0574+ 1.76* -1.38** 2.25 -94.3*  
Capital -428+ 1.05** 1940* 1.07* 1.05** 23* 
Source: B. Lee (1995) ** 99% significance level, * 95% 
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